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E-mail advertisement, as one instrument in the marketing mix, allows companies to 
collect fine-grained behavioural data about individual users’ e-mail reading habits 
realised through sophisticated tracking mechanisms. Such tracking can be harmful for 
user privacy and security. This problem is especially severe since e-mail tracking 
techniques gather data without user consent. Striving to increase privacy and security 
in e-mail communication, the paper makes three contributions. First, a large database 
of newsletter e-mails is developed. This data facilitates investigating the prevalence of e-
mail tracking among 300 global enterprises from Germany, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. Second, countermeasures are developed for automatically identifying 
and blocking e-mail tracking mechanisms without impeding the user experience. The 
approach consists of identifying important tracking descriptors and creating a neural 
network-based detection model. Last, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is 
established by means of empirical experimentation. The results suggest a classification 
accuracy of 99.99%. 
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Introduction 
Data about e-mail reading behaviour can be used to infer valuable commercial information. In marketing, 
for example, it allows user preferences to be derived and the reach and effectiveness of e-mail marketing 
campaigns to be measured (Hasouneh and Alqeed 2010). Contemporary e-mail tracking techniques 
enable the sender to track how often an e-mail is read, which device the recipient uses, and the time as 
well as location from which the e-mail is read (Fabian et al. 2015). Importantly, this information is 
typically gathered without the recipient’s consent or acknowledgement. Tracking can also constitute a 
security threat. Spammers and hackers commonly rely on e-mail tracking to detect and collect active e-
mail addresses for their illegal activities. From an end-user perspective, e-mail tracking procedures 
therefore involve various security and privacy issues.  
Mail users should be equipped with effective and reliable protection methods. In order to provide 
advancements towards user privacy and security protection, this paper follows the design science research 
paradigm (Peffers et al. 2007). The study starts with a survey of relevant literature and proposes a 
definition for e-mail tracking. Following that, e-mail tracking technology is explained. Further 
contributions involve the experimental analysis of information that can be gathered using e-mail tracking, 
and a critical comparison of currently available protection measures. Then, with regard to problem 
identification and relevance, our paper presents a large empirical study, confirming e-mail tracking as an 
important and widespread privacy issue.  
This motivates another major contribution of our research: the design of countermeasures, encompassing 
the development of a novel method for tracking-image identification that is based on machine learning. A 
demonstration and evaluation are realised through a quantitative and empirical evaluation of the 
developed detection model based on a large dataset of over 4,500 mails from 300 global companies, 
including more than 110,000 images. This article will serve to communicate our results. 
Definition and Related Work 
E-mail tracking and its impact on privacy are often mentioned in the general press, for example in 
conjunction with scandals that have been uncovered using e-mail tracking technologies (Evers 2006). As 
far as the academic literature is concerned, surprisingly few papers have looked into the topic (Bonfrer 
and Drèze 2009; Fabian et al., 2015; Hasouneh and Alqeed 2010) and these do not focus on 
countermeasures for e-mail tracking. Some initiatives to develop anti-tracking software have been 
undertaken in corporate practice. However, as we show below, they do not provide sufficient protection. 
The lack of effective countermeasures motivates this research, which emphasises the technical and 
process-related aspects of e-mail tracking. In accordance with this focus and with inspiration from Fabian 
et al. (Fabian et al. 2015), we propose the following definition of the term e-mail tracking: E-mail tracking 
allows mail senders to gather information on an individual recipient’s reading behaviour of single mails 
without the need for any further interaction or the recipient’s permission.  
Some characteristics of the definition deserve further clarification. Individual recipient: Relevant 
techniques allow the gathering of information on the individual recipient’s behaviour. This is important in 
order to distinguish e-mail tracking procedures from general aggregated traffic measuring techniques. 
Reading behaviour: The minimum requirement is that a technique provides information about whether a 
single mail has been opened by a specific recipient. Single mails: To fulfil the requirement of marketers or 
other trackers, a tracking mechanism provides information on the level of single mails. In combination 
with the individual recipient requirement, this allows trackers to infer the reading behaviour of every 
recipient for every mail that was issued. Without any further interaction: This emphasises methods that 
do not require further user actions than simply opening an e-mail. One technical implication of this 
understanding is that we concentrate on tracking pixels but not on tracking links which users need to click 
on (Fabian et al., 2015). The important aspect is that simply opening the mail is sufficient to trigger the 
tracking mechanism. Without recipient’s permission: This emphasises the fact that the mechanism does 
not require any acknowledgement of the recipient; the technique therefore distinguishes itself from 
functions such as mail return receipts. This characteristic involves possibilities of secret surveillance. 
From a technological point of view, e-mail tracking can be understood as an adaptation of web tracking 
mechanisms to HTML-based e-mails. Unlike e-mail tracking, web-tracking mechanisms have received 
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much attention in the literature. The use of web tracking in different situations (Javed 2013; Jensen et al. 
2007) as well as their detection (Alsaid and Martin 2003; Fonseca et al. 2005) have been analysed. 
Prevention of such mechanisms, including evaluation of software solutions, has also been the topic of 
studies (Fonseca et al. 2005; Leon et al. 2012). Other research emphasises the technical aspects of web 
tracking, such as different categories of web bugs (Dobias 2011) or the potential for aggregating multiple 
server log files (Evans et al. 2003). Yet another stream of research aims at supporting website operators 
through reviewing and developing criteria for web tracking software selection (Fourie and Bothma 2007; 
Nakatani and Chuang 2011) or, more generally, evaluating the market for web tracking software 
(Krishnamurthy and Wills 2009). 
Some web tracking papers hint at the possibility of applying tracking techniques to HTML-based e-mails 
(Bouguettaya and Eltoweissy 2003; Harding et al. 2001; Martin et al. 2003; Moscato and Moscato 2009; 
Moscato et al. 2013). However, none of these studies provide further details of such an undertaking or 
discusses the peculiarities of e-mail tracking. Clearly, some similarity between web and e-mail tracking 
mechanisms exists, especially in terms of tracking technology. From an organisational point of view, a 
similarity may also be seen in the fact that the tracking infrastructure can be operated by the company or 
a contracted service provider, though in-house solutions seem to be extremely scarce in web tracking 
contexts (Burkell and Fortier 2013; Sipior et al. 2011; Waisberg and Kaushik 2009). However, one 
important difference concerns tracking precision. With e-mail tracking, any information can be easily 
linked to the user’s e-mail address, which is an almost unique identifier of the user. Consequently, 
tracking users across devices, locations, channels etc. is much easier compared to web tracking, which 
heavily depends on the browser environment and its configuration. In this sense, e-mail tracking can be 
considered even more privacy intrusive, which further supports the need for effective countermeasures.   
E-Mail Tracking Technology 
To give an overview of e-mail tracking methodology and the degree to which it impedes user privacy, the 
following sections review the e-mail tracking process and detail how and which information is captured 
about mail recipients. This provides a foundation for developing effective countermeasures. 
E-Mail Tracking Process 
 
Figure 1: E-Mail Tracking Operation Mode 
 
The tracking process (Figure 1) is based on e-mails that reference external resources. Therefore, it starts 
with the preparation of an HTML-based e-mail by the sender, since plain-text e-mails do not facilitate 
such references. This e-mail, which includes a tracking-image reference, passes several mail transfer 
agents (MTAs) until reaching the receiver’s MTA. Next, the recipient opens a mail client, which 
synchronises the local mail repository with the newest version of the recipient’s MTA. When the recipient 
opens the e-mail with a tracking image, the mail client requests the image from the referenced 
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destination. The web server logs this request and provides the image to the recipient’s client. Afterwards, 
log analysis allows information to be deducted on the recipient’s e-mail reading behaviour. For example, if 
the e-mail is opened on different devices, every individual access is logged, which allows for cross-device 
tracking. 
Even though the structure of tracking image references varies, the following anonymised reference serves 
as an example of tracking image references: http://www.example.com/action/view/3827/rtg2ryw3. 
Information Gathered by E-Mail Tracking 
To elaborate on the collection of behavioural data via e-mail tracking, we distinguish between primary 
and secondary information. The former is directly extracted from web server access logs, whereas the 
latter can be derived from combining primary information with auxiliary data sources. 
In order to assess the extent of primary information available to a tracker, we constructed a prototypical 
tracking environment, which includes an Apache webserver to log data relevant to e-mail tracking. The 
entries in the server log file provide seven major pieces of information: (1) the Internet Protocol (IP) 
address of the host that requests the image file, (2) the date and time of the file request, (3) the request 
itself, which includes the URL and GET variables, (4) the status code of the request, (5) the amount of 
bytes that have been sent in response, (6) the referrer URL from the client, and (7) a string characterising 
the user agent. Furthermore, when a file is requested multiple times (i.e., it generates multiple entries), it 
allows information to be derived with respect to a user’s reading behaviour. In our test environment, a 
new log entry was created every time an e-mail was opened. 
With respect to secondary information, the first possibility is to induce the fact that the user read or at 
least opened the e-mail. As we show in more detail below, this follows from the fact that current e-mail 
clients do not download images before the corresponding e-mail is opened. Accordingly, the existence of 
multiple log entries allows for the conclusion that the e-mail has been opened multiple times. The 
combination of multiple entries for one mail, as well as multiple entries from one user for different mails, 
provides insight into the recipient’s e-mail reading behaviour.  
Furthermore, possibilities exist for identifying whether an e-mail has been forwarded. The usage of IP 
geolocation in combination with a log entry aggregation allows the detection of forwarded mails. HP, for 
example, used this technique to investigate the release of confidential information (Evers 2006). Special 
log entries allow one to determine whether an e-mail has been printed (Campaign Monitor 2010). It is 
also possible to gather information about the user environment by analysing the user agent string, which 
is part of a log entry (Agosti and Di Nunzio 2007). Location-related information can be gathered using 
geolocation services (Poese et al. 2011). Based on a reverse lookup of an IP address, a log entry may also 
help determine a user’s affiliation to a company or institution. These examples illustrate only some 
options for trackers and the potential for gaining insights into user behaviour through combining and 
correlating tracking data with external information. 
International Study on E-Mail Tracking Usage 
Having established the intrusiveness of e-mail tracking, a relevant follow-up question concerns the 
prevalence of tracking mechanisms. To answer this, we collected a unique empirical dataset of e-mail 
newsletters, which allowed us to evaluate the status quo of e-mail tracking. Although potentially not 
representative of companies’ marketing communication in general, newsletter e-mails are a suitable 
vehicle for this analysis. First, the wide availability of different newsletters simplifies systematic data 
collection and facilitates the gathering of a large amount of data. Second, it seems likely that companies 
use e-mail tracking to assess the effectiveness of their newsletters (Hasouneh and Alqeed 2010). To 
further increase this likelihood, we concentrate on larger companies because these are on average faster to 
adopt novel technology (Premkumar and Roberts 1999). Contrary to Fabian et al. who performed a 
comparable analysis among 64 German companies (Fabian et al. 2015), we adopted an international 
scope and gathered e-mail newsletters from the top-100 companies (ranked by revenue) in Germany 
(GER), Great Britain (GB), and the United States (USA).  
To gather the data, we create two identities and corresponding e-mail addresses using Gmail. With each 
account, we signed up for the newsletters of the pre-selected 300 companies and collected e-mails in a 13-
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week period (calendar week 22-34) in 2015. To identify tracking elements, we compared the e-mails 
received on each account. That is, we examined the HTML content of each pair of e-mails sent to matched 
accounts and searched for deviations in image URLs. To obtain ground truth data, we classified images 
for which the referral URLs do not match as tracking image, and all others as non-tracking. Last, we 
manually checked all tracking elements to avoid classification errors. However, to avoid bias from senders 
changing their e-mail policy in response to the reading behaviour of users they were tracking, we ensured 
that none of the external images were actually requested from the web server.  
In total, each artificial identity received 4,505 e-mails, 1,442 (32%) of which came from Germany, 1,489 
(33%) from the United Kingdom (UK), and 1,428 (32%) from the United States (US). The remainder, 
referred to as various below, consisted of e-mails sent from multiple countries. This usually applies if 
externally contracted third parties send mails for several clients in different countries from the same 
address.  
General Statistics 
The fraction of HTML compared to plain text e-mails is interesting since only HTML-based e-mails 
facilitate tracking. Out of 4,505 e-mails, 1,266 (28%) were in plain-text format, while the remaining 3,239 
(72%) were HTML-based. Considering the HTML e-mails, 2,920 (90%) contained external image 
references. These e-mails could facilitate tracking. The HTML e-mails contained references to 110,080 
external images, with an average of 38 external images per e-mail. 18% of the e-mails contained a single 
external image. Figure 2 gives an overview of the key measures relevant for e-mail tracking: 2,292 e-mails 
contained tracking elements, which equated to a ratio of 51% (71%) among all e-mails (HTML e-mails). 
 
Figure 2: Dataset Overview: Tracking / Non-Tracking  
Our results reveal that the tracking quote and the fraction of HTML-based e-mails varied across countries 
(Figure 3 & Table 1). The proportion of HTML e-mails was 88% (1,375), 34% (513), and 84% (1,205) for 
Germany, the UK, and the US, respectively. Concentrating on these e-mails, the tracking quote was the 
highest in Germany (88%), and rather similar for the US (63%) and the UK (62%).  
 
 
Figure 3: Tracking 
Elements per Country  
 
 
Table 1: Tracking Elements per Country 
Country Tracking elements Total 
0 1 2 3 
GER 231 1206 5  1442 
UK 1173 300 16  1489 
US 665 636 107 20 1428 
Various 144 2   146 
Total 2213 2144 128 20 4505 
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 Internal and External Tracking 
The main options for performing e-mail tracking are in-house systems and contracted service providers, 
the latter of which prevail in web tracking. To shed light on the frequency of the two options in e-mail 
tracking, we differentiated between internal and external tracking. We defined tracking as internal if the 
web server hosting the tracking image belonged to the company that sent the newsletter, and as external 
otherwise. To handle ambiguous cases, we defined a third category, ‘various’, which subsumed e-mails 
with multiple tracking images from internal and external web servers. Figure 4 and Table 2 show the 
results of this analysis. It reveals that Germany had the highest internal tracking rate at 86%, followed by 
the UK with 60%, and the US with 34%. Only mails from the US used internal and external tracking at the 
same time. 
 
Figure 4: Tracking Type 
Distribution per Country  
Tracking Location 
We used geolocation services to assess the tracking-server location. Table 3 shows the results for all 
tracking elements and corresponding web servers. Specifically, it depicts the two-letter ISO3166-1:2013 
abbreviation of the country and the number of occurrence for main servers, and tracking servers in each 
country. As noted above, references to external images in a single e-mail may point to multiple servers. 
We defined the main server as the one that hosts the majority of external image references. According to 
our data, tracking images are rarely hosted on the main server if multiple servers occur in a single e-mail. 
For example, this situation may arise when a company stores images on an internal server but has 
outsourced tracking to an external service provider. To clarify the frequency of such an approach, Table 3 
distinguishes between main and tracking servers. 
Table 3 suggests that most countries differ in the number of occurrences for tracking and main server 
locations. One possible explanation is the use of external e-mail tracking providers that operate their 
business in a different country. Another reason might involve different regulations with regard to tracking 
technologies. In terms of server locations, Figure 5 classifies countries into three groups according to 
whether they contain more, the same, or fewer tracking servers than main servers. 
Table 2: Tracking Type Distribution per Country 
Country Tracking type Total 
External Internal Mixed 
GER 166 1045  1211 
UK 127 189  316 
US 485 261 17 763 
Various  2  2 
Total 778 1497 17 2292 
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Figure 5: Country Classification  
 







Austria AT 77 52 
Australia AU 6 0 
Belgium BE 0 1 
Germany DE 913 1399 
France FR 39 1 
Great Britain GB 68 143 
Ireland IE 14 14 
Italy IT 0 23 
Netherlands NL 9 107 
Sweden SE 1 1 
Singapore SG 2 0 
United States US 1331 719 
 
 
Countries that host more main servers than tracking servers are Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the 
Netherlands. We aim to investigate in future work whether regulations related to tracking techniques are 
stricter in these countries, or if there are other reasons that tracking services are hosted abroad. In Italy 
and Belgium, only main images but no tracking images are hosted. Another group of countries host more 
tracking servers than main servers, such as Austria, Australia, France, and the United States. Singapore 
and Australia are especially interesting since only tracking images but no main images are hosted in these 
countries according to our dataset. Foreign tracking servers are least common for e-mails from US 
companies, where 99.9% of the tracking images are hosted within the nation. 
More tracking than main server
Tracking and main server are equal
Less tracking than main server
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Countermeasure Conceptualisation and Review 
The previous analysis shows that e-mail tracking is a common phenomenon, which emphasises the 
importance of countermeasures to increase privacy and security of individual users. In the following, we 
conceptualise technological options for countermeasure design. We also review existing implementations 
and discuss their merits and limitations in order to verify the necessity of developing a novel approach. 
Classification of Countermeasures 
To summarise the sphere of possible solutions, we distinguished between deceptive and preventive 
countermeasures. We further divided the latter into holistic and selective approaches. Deceptive 
countermeasures strive to hide or modify the information sent to a mail sender or a third-party tracking 
provider so that these obtain selected, modified, or deliberately corrupted information. As Figure 1 shows, 
this strategy can be implemented through introducing a proxy server in the communication between e-
mail sender and receiver, which caches the referenced images. The role of the proxy is to download and 
cache all images referenced in an in-coming e-mail prior to transferring it to the recipient’s mail client. 
The sender of a tracking e-mail will then recognise the first access of a tracking image through the proxy, 
but will not be able to observe subsequent requests due to multiple opens. More importantly, the tracked 
identity is that of the proxy, whereas the reading behaviour of actual recipients remains unobservable. 
Figure 6 depicts two slightly different versions of this approach. In the first version (left), the proxy 
modifies the incoming mail so that the formerly externally referenced images are included in the mail. In 
the second version (right), the proxy server caches the externally referenced images and the references are 
changed so that they point to the proxy server. Every time the mail is opened, the images are fetched from 
the proxy and not the original tracking server.  
  
Figure 6: Deceptive Prevention Approach 
 
The strength of the proxy-based approach is the possibility to conceal some tracking information. 
Weaknesses are related to the fact that the referenced images, including tracking images, are still 
accessed. The sender is therefore able to gather some, though potentially fuzzy, information. Another 
weakness is the necessity of server-side support. Operating a proxy server appears prohibitively expensive 
for an individual user. Even among e-mail clients, we were unable to identify an actual implementation of 
the proxy-based approach and, more generally, any deceptive countermeasure specific to e-mail tracking. 
Even though Google Mail introduced proxy technology for their web client in 2013 and hides some 
information such as the IP address from trackers, we conducted experiments that showed that every mail 
open is still registered by the tracking software. Therefore, proxy-based deception approaches do not yet 
provide full tracking protection. 
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A second option for countering tracking is to block all external content referenced in an e-mail. We call 
this approach holistic prevention (Figure 7). Given that all tracking procedures known today depend on 
references to external content, the strength of the block-all approach is a fully-reliable protection against 
tracking. From a technical point of view, ease of implementation on either the server’s or the client’s side 
may be considered as another advantage. In fact, most contemporary mail clients allow users to block 
external content. However, the massive loss of information and decrease in user experience resulting from 
the exclusion of all referenced images and the corresponding content constitute severe disadvantages. For 
example, consequences of the holistic prevention approach include incorrect formatting, loss of styling 
elements, and potentially misinterpretation if external images convey important information and/or are 
crucial to correctly interpret an e-mail message. 
Finally, selective countermeasures are based on identifying and blocking tracking elements within an e-
mail (Figure 8). The idea is to categorise the referenced images into content-providing and tracking 
images. Assuming that images of the former category do not provide tracking functionality, they remain 
untouched, whereas tracking images are removed from the e-mail. The strength of the identify-and-block 
concept is the combination of systematic prevention of tracking images while preserving the full user-
experience. The possible pitfall is the risk of misidentification. The solution will work only as well as the 
algorithm for tracking-image identification.  
 
Figure 8: Selective Prevention Approach 
Based on the review of alternative options for countermeasure design, we argue that a selective identify-
and-block strategy provides the best balance between preventing user tracking and sustaining user 
experience. Accordingly, we concentrate on this approach in the remainder of the paper. In the next 
section, we report the results of an empirical evaluation of available implementations of the identify-and-
block concept. Given the criticality of distinguishing content-providing and tracking images with high 
accuracy in this approach, we will then present a prototype of an identification engine and an empirically 
test of its effectiveness. 
Selective Prevention – Empirical Experiments 
Some mail clients and add-ons to mail clients support selective prevention. To examine the 
appropriateness of existing implementations, we created a testing infrastructure including e-mail 
accounts, e-mail clients, operating systems, hardware, and a third-party analysis tool 
(https://emailprivacytester.com/). The latter sent e-mails with tracking elements to our accounts and 
reported the information gathered through tracking. Using this infrastructure, we assessed the reactions 
of nine popular mail clients. More specifically, the selection of clients drew inspiration from a study by 
Litmus Labs and encompassed desktop, mobile, and web clients. We selected the three most popular mail 
clients in each category for analysis. Together, these clients were responsible for 92% of all mail openings 
(Litmus Labs 2015). It is worth noting that the mobile category had the greatest share with 47% of mail 
openings, which highlights the importance of mobile devices in today’s e-mail communication.  
Table 4 reports the results of our mail client evaluation, which distinguishes three process steps: before 
mail open, after mail open, and after displaying images. The first step characterises the point at which an 
e-mail client has synchronised with the mail server and the mail is visible in the list of incoming mails but 
has not been opened. After mail open is the moment when the mail is selected and opened but no further 
action has been performed. After display images refers to the time when the e-mail has been opened and 
the display of external images has been allowed by the user. This is only applicable if the mail client does 
not download external images by default. A check mark means that the mail client does not fetch the 
tracking image and therefore provides sufficient protection against tracking. In contrast, a cross indicates 
that the tracking images have been downloaded and tracking data can be gathered. 
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Table 4 reveals that no mail client fetched referenced images prior to opening an e-mail. Afterwards, 
however, four out of nine clients fetched referenced images directly. The other five mail clients fetched the 
tracking image in the third step. Given that none of the mail clients filtered tracking elements, we 
concluded that they failed to provide sufficient tracking protection. 
Table 4: E-Mail Clients Usage Share and Protection against Tracking Images 










Outlook 8% ü ü û û 
Apple Mail 8% ü û - û 
Windows Live 
Mail 2% ü ü û û 
Mobile 
iPhone Mail 28% ü û - û 
iPad Mail 11% ü û - û 
Android Mail 8% ü ü û û 
Webmail 
Gmail 18% ü û - û 
Outlook.com 5% ü ü û û 
Yahoo! 4% ü ü û û 
 
With respect to add-ons, the second approach in the selective prevention category, we identified two 
representatives called Uglyemail and Pixelblock. The Uglyemail browser add-on allows the detection of 
tracking pixels from nine third-party tracking providers, but does not offer functionality to selectively 
block these images. Pixelblock blocks images with a one-pixel size, but fails to identify tracking images of 
different size. Both add-ons share the additional disadvantage that usage is restricted to the Google 
Chrome browser and Google’s mail service Gmail. Given their restricted applicability, we conclude that 
browser add-ons also fail to provide appropriate tracking protection. 
In summary, none of the tracking prevention solutions provided sufficient, practical and universal 
protection against e-mail tracking, which confirms the demand for novel solutions. Therefore, we 
proceeded with designing a prototype for a selective countermeasure and the corresponding identification 
engine in particular. 
Tracking Image Detection 
Tracking image detection can be interpreted as the classification of unknown images. All images that are 
referenced within an e-mail are used as input, and the classification process needs to decide whether or 
not each individual image is a tracking image. The detection process can be conceptualised in two steps. 
Frist, the identification of essential characteristics that distinguish normal from tracking images will 
result in a detection model that is based on various image attributes. Second, a classification decision 
needs to be made based on the detection model. This two-step approach ensures a certain independence 
of the detection model from the decision model. As a result, multiple different detection and decision 
techniques can be used and easily compared. 
The detection model proposed in this paper is based on six different categories of data. The first three 
categories (image attributes, reference structure, and e-mail structure) subsume aspects that are directly 
associated with the source code of an e-mail which is part of the e-mail body. The fourth category (image 
server) is associated with the servers that host the images. The fifth category uses information from the 
whole dataset to assess whether a server is a tracking server. The sixth category covers the e-mail header.  
In order to gather information on tracking images and to allow for a later validation of the developed 
model, the total dataset was divided into a training and a test set. The training set was used to gather 
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information on tracking pixels and to train the detection model. The training set accounted for 76% of the 
total mails, while the other 24% were assigned to the test set, which was used for validation purposes. 
Image Attributes 
The first category covers image attributes that are directly associated with an image element as well as 
attributes referring to centrally defined style information from Cascading Style Sheets (CSS). Typically, 
images are embedded using the <img> tag of the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) (Musciano and 
Kennedy 2006). The analysis and model conception were restricted to attributes occurring in at least 1% 
of the images, since it would be difficult to derive representative results from a smaller amount of cases. 
Furthermore, the more attributes there were to be analysed, the slower the performance of the whole 
solution. 
The border attribute defines the thickness of the border that is drawn around an image (Musciano and 
Kennedy 2006). While the border attribute only occurred in one third of all tracking images, it occurs in 
more than three-quarters of all non-tracking images. In our dataset, all values different from zero (or an 
empty value) occurred in non-tracking images only. The border attribute could therefore be used to 
identify images clearly as non-tracking images if their border was provided and deviated from zero. 
The width attribute allows the horizontal size of a displayed image to be specified once the website or e-
mail has been rendered (Musciano and Kennedy 2006). 65% of the tracking pixels with a specified width 
had a width of one. The height, similar to the width, allows the height to be defined at which an image is 
displayed. Another result of our empirical analysis is that the vast majority of tracking pixels are 
quadratic. One assumption from related work was that tracking pixels have an area less than 10 and are 
usually very small (Fabian et al. 2015). However, our dataset also contains 27 tracking pixels with a 
specified area of more than 10, which therefore does not match the former model criteria.  
The style properties that were considered in the analysis are composed of the style attribute tag and 
centrally provided CSS commands. In order to avoid an individual discussion of each attribute and to be 
able to dynamically expand the attribute classification, categories of CSS commands were set up, 
subsuming commands which fulfil several criteria and allow us to either identify tracking images or to 
confidently release an image from the suspicion of being a tracking element. This is similar to a black- and 
whitelisting approach. Through the processing of the centrally provided CSS information for each image, 
an additional 24% of non-tracking images could be classified.  
The title attribute can be used for various HTML elements. It was only used with one tracking image in 
our dataset and was in this case empty. Therefore, it can be assumed that if the title attribute with content 
is provided, the image is not a tracking image. 
The attributes vspace and hspace define white spaces around images. The analysis showed that the 
tracking images have only zero as a value for both attributes. Therefore, all images that have a hspace or 
vspace value larger than zero could be classified as non-tracking images. Similarly, the attributes align, id 
and usemap only occur in non-tracking images. An image that uses any of the three attributes can be 
classified as a non-tracking image. 
The alt and class attributes showed very mixed analysis results. We decided to leave them out since they 
could result in an overfitting optimisation of the detection model to the specific dataset, not leading to 
generally applicable results.  
Reference Structure 
The second category includes aspects that relate to the referencing link that points to the image (i.e., 
URL). This category focuses on the textual and structural analysis of the reference. The usage of 
individualised links allows both the user and the e-mail to be identified. This is a necessary condition for 
tracking images. 
Therefore, an important aspect is the detection of individualised references. In a first approach, we 
identified several aspects that distinguish tracking from non-tracking references. One example criterion 
involves combinations of letters, numbers, and again letters. Based on the insights from this initial 
analysis, we developed a scoring model indicating the likelihood that a link is individualised. Tracking 
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references often fulfil the corresponding textual characteristics. Nonetheless, they are occasionally also 
encountered in non-tracking images. Therefore, several aspects need to be used in combination for 
detection.  
The wordlist approach tries to identify tracking images by using a dictionary lookup to identify 
individualised parts of references. The idea is that non-tracking references (e.g., 
http://www.SLD.TLD/common/images/general/spacer.gif) usually contain a lot of common words that 
should be found in a dictionary, in contrast to tracking references that contain fewer or no common 
words. For the analysis, an English wordlist with 250,000 entries and a German wordlist with 190,000 
entries were used. Each reference was split up into single parts that were checked in both wordlists. 
Afterwards, a measure was calculated that expresses the ratio of parts that were found in any of the 
dictionaries in relation to the total number of parts. However, it turned out that this approach did not 
provide results that clearly supported the decision process.  
The letter distribution approach, similar to the wordlist, tries to identify how “normal” the image 
reference is, compared to typical distributions of letter occurrences within texts. Since links could be in 
both languages, distributions for the German (Beutelspacher 2015) and English languages (Lewand 2000) 
were considered. An analysis of the calculated measures shows that the deviations of the values for 
tracking images in relation to the rest of the images varied in both directions, higher as well as lower, 
while the deviation in the higher direction occurred more often. This deviation information can be used 
for tracking image identification.  
Another aspect that could assist the identification of tracking images is the similarity to other references. 
Tracking references often distinguish themselves from other images in the mail with regard to their 
structure. A literature review on URL-similarity analysis revealed that various approaches have been 
developed. Often, the similarity of nodes (URLs) within a graph is used, which usually represents a 
subgraph of the World Wide Web (Benczúr et al. 2006; Cho et al. 1998; Lin et al. 2006; Maurer and Höfer 
2012; Menczer 2004; Qi et al. 2007; Wu et al. 2012). Most approaches have been designed for hypertext 
web pages with two major requirements: the first is some machine interpretable text that can be used for 
textual word analysis, and the second involves hyperlinks that point to other web pages. However, both 
requirements are not fulfilled for image elements referenced in e-mails, which means that the graph-
based approaches are currently not applicable for the given problem setting.  
Therefore, another appropriate link-similarity measure was conceptualised. It is important to keep in 
mind that the measure should express structural similarity and not direct equality of each occurring 
character. In order to achieve this, the similarity of two links was defined as the amount of identical 
characters except digits, where the longer link is used as a comparison basis. If digits occur at the same 
position in each link, they are interpreted as equal characters, regardless of whether or not they are 
actually identical.  
The keyword filter evaluates whether the use of keywords is useful for the identification of tracking 
images. The idea is that specific words are only used in the context of tracking pixels, while some other 
keywords might only be used in non-tracking images. This approach is similar to the black-/whitelist 
approach. Since the goal was to identify keywords that are independent of specific senders and recipients, 
further filtering was necessary. Finally, a whitelist of 14 entries and a blacklist with 32 entries were 
created. 
The user-id as part of a reference is an aspect that combines the advantages from the huge dataset and 
the reference analysis. The term ‘user-id’ is defined as a unique identifier which each tracking link of a 
specific sender contains and which is not part of any other non-tracking image link. It is assumed that the 
user identifier is included in every tracking link for the same recipient, while the e-mail or content 
identifier is different for each e-mail and would therefore only occur in a single mail. It turned out that 
user-ids could be determined for 41% of the tracking-mail senders. 
The text only aspect analyses whether the image references are only composed of alphabetic letters, 
except special characters that are used for separation. Tracking links often contain randomly generated 
components including numbers for identification purposes. And, in fact, all tracking elements within our 
training dataset contained at least one digit. 
 E-Mail Tracking: Status Quo and Novel Countermeasures 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 13 
The file extension aspect focuses on the file extensions of the images that are referenced within the 
dataset. While the majority of file extensions are used for both tracking and non-tracking images, some 
file extensions occur in only one category. For example, the extensions “cfm”, “php” and “ssp” only occur 
in tracking images, while the extensions “io”, “jpe”, “ver” and “xiti” only occur in non-tracking images.  
The regular expression patterns describe the structure of tracking-image references by means of regular 
expressions. Our analysis shows that tracking pixels from different senders are quite similar in terms of 
their structure. For the training dataset, 79 different types of patterns could be identified. After 
optimisation of the regular expressions, all tracking image references could be detected, while no non-
tracking images matched. The regular expression approach would be sufficient to detect all tracking image 
references within the given dataset, but could result in heavy overfitting. 
Further aspects that we analysed, but which did not improve results, included the amount of special 
characters, the actual number of numerical digits in links, and capital letters. 
E-Mail Structure 
The third category, e-mail structure, focuses on aspects that describe the occurrence of images based on 
their position within the structure of an e-mail. Furthermore, the number of occurrences is considered. 
The position of images within e-mails is an important criterion. During the data analysis phase, it was 
noted that tracking pixels seem to occur often at the beginning or end of an e-mail. This seems reasonable, 
since they do not provide actual content. Another explanation might be the use of external services or 
software that just appends the tracking image to the top or end of an e-mail. Extended analysis reveals 
that, indeed, the vast majority of tracking images occurred at either the beginning or the end of an e-mail. 
If the first and last three images were always taken together, they accounted for 98.9% of all tracking 
images within the training set.  
The second aspect is related to the number of occurrences of an image within an e-mail. The analysis of 
our data shows that no image that was referenced at least three times within the same mail was a tracking 
pixel. This information alone could be used to classify 39,994 (48%) image occurrences (3,134 different 
images) as non-tracking images. 
Image Server 
The fourth category, image server, describes aspects related to the server hosting the referenced images. 
The first aspect is the occurrence of servers within an e-mail. The relative occurrence of servers can 
provide valuable information with regard to tracking image detection. For example: If a company uses an 
external tracking provider, the regular images for the e-mail may be hosted by the company itself, while 
the tracking pixel is hosted by the tracking server provider on a different server. Therefore, the previously 
introduced term “main server” is useful. A short analysis showed that in the training dataset, 94% of the 
tracking images were not hosted on the main server. This supports the hypothesis that tracking images 
are usually not hosted on the main server if one exists. 
The second aspect concerns the location of the server. First, the location of all image servers is 
determined via domain-name resolution and IP address geolocation (Wang et al. 2011). Then, the main 
server is used as a reference for all server assessments within a single mail. Location points are assigned 
as an approximation of the distance between the server in question and the main server. It turns out that 
more than two-thirds (68%) of the servers with the highest point score per email hosted tracking pixels.  
Server Black-/Whitelisting 
The fifth category is based on the entire dataset and distinguishes whether the image server in question is 
hosting only tracking images, only non-tracking images, or both. This idea of black- and whitelisting is 
borrowed from the detection and prevention of unsolicited emails (SPAM) (Cormack 2007). For the 
application in our context, the elements of the lists are servers providing images that are referenced in the 
e-mails. This is an important difference from SPAM classification, where usually the sender or MTA is the 
object of investigation. 
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Our blacklist contains all servers that host tracking images but no non-tracking images. The second list is 
the whitelist with servers that only provide non-tracking images. The third case, mixed hosts, contains all 
servers that are part of neither the first nor the second list. This procedure was executed for the entire 
dataset. The majority of servers (57%) were part of the whitelist. A little more than one-third (34%) of the 
hosts were part of the blacklist. The remaining 9% of hosts were part of the mixed category, since they 
hosted both types of images. It has to be noted that the usage of servers could change over time. The 
approach is therefore only as up-to-date as the black-/whitelist itself, and regular updates should be 
ensured in order to minimise misclassifications.  
Header Components 
Any e-mail is composed of an e-mail body and an e-mail header. Usually, the e-mail header contains 
technical information and is not visible to the end user. The sixth category analyses fields of the e-mail 
header. Here, the header fields “list-unsubscribe”, “reply-To”, “message-ID”, “content-type”, “return-
path”, and “received-SPF” have been selected based on initial tests. A method was developed which 
allowed already classified image links to be correlated with the six header fields. The majority of 
classifications could be realised through a customised text search in the list-unsubscribe header field. The 
header fields reply-to, content-type, return-path, and received-spf did not cause any misidentifications. 
Overall, 99.8% of the occurring matches were indeed tracking images. Therefore, header analysis proved 
very useful. 
Detection Model Summary and Dataset Dependency 
We now turn to discussing the dataset dependency of the detection model in order to estimate how 
suitable the individual attributes are for detecting tracking elements in new, unknown datasets. A 
distinction will be made through the association to one of the following groups: low, medium, or high 
dataset dependency. Table 5 gives an overview of the model aspects and their dataset dependency. 
We assume that the aspects of image attributes, e-mail structure, image server and header components 
have low dataset dependency, since they represent properties that are characteristic for tracking images in 
general. The black- / whitelisting of image servers is assumed to be medium dataset dependent. Lists of 
tracking servers of external provider are applicable for all other e-mails that use the same provider. 
The majority of reference structure attributes are assumed to have a low dataset dependency since they 
describe characteristics of tracking references that need to be fulfilled for the unique identification of e-
mail and recipient. The reference keyword matching and the file extension analysis are assumed to have a 
medium dataset dependency, since they are relatively dependent on the data from which they have been 
derived, but are applicable to new datasets as well. The sender identifiers (user-id) are highly dependent 
Table 5: Model Summary and Dataset Dependency 
Model Category Model Aspects (Dataset Dependency) 
Image Attributes width, height, area, border, alt, style_blacklist, style_whitelist, vspace, 
hspace, title, class, align, id, usemap (all low dataset dependency) 
Reference Structure text-only (low), numbers_ratio (low), upperletters_ratio (low), 
exceptional_reference (low), match_blacklist (medium), match_whitelist 
(medium), file_extension_blacklist (medium), file_extension_whitelist 
(medium), match_user-id (high), match_regular_expression (high) 
E-Mail Structure image_occurrence, internal_image, image_position (all low dataset 
dependency) 
Image Server server_location_points, main_server (both medium dataset dependency) 
Server Black-/ 
Whitelisting 
server_blacklist, server_whitelist (both medium dataset dependency) 
Header Components unsubscribe_link, reply_to, message_id, content_type, return_path, 
received_spf (all low dataset dependency) 
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on the dataset, since they were generated based on the dataset and are specific to the e-mail recipients. 
Even though the regular expressions are applicable to other e-mails as well, it is assumed that they are not 
characterising all possibly occurring tracking image references and might therefore mislead future 
detection processes for entirely different e-mails.  
Taken together, the developed model seems to be very applicable to different e-mails. Since the 
aforementioned regular expression attribute seems to be highly dataset dependent and shows a high 
explanatory power at the same time, we do not consider the attribute for future classifications, since it 
might distort the classification results and accuracy evaluation for future e-mails. This step was taken in 
order to make the detection process more independent from the specific dataset that was used. 
Validation 
This section evaluates the classification accuracy and execution time of the proposed mechanism for 
detecting tracking images in e-mails. The approach consists of the detection model (described above) and 
a decision model, which aggregates the model aspects and forms an overall decision. In order to perform 
the validation, the total dataset was divided into a training set and a test set. With this separation, a 
distribution similar to the total dataset was for the goal, in particular with respect to the tracking 
elements. The separation of the 4,505 mails resulted in a distribution of 1,086 (24.1%) mails (26781 
images) in the test set and 3,419 (75.9%) mails (83299 images) in the training set. 
An artificial neural network (ANN) was used as a decision technique. Classification tasks are a popular 
application area of ANNs (Fausett 1994). The attributes of the decision model are given as inputs to the 
ANN, which classifies whether or not the image in question is a tracking image.  
It is expected that the ANN approach benefits from its capacity to detect various complex patterns, as well 
as the ability to handle incomplete information (Fausett 1994). For the given setting, multilayer 
perceptrons (MLPs) are appropriate. They can process categorical and numerical input and deliver 
categorical output values. They can also capture complex – nonlinear – relationships between inputs and 
outputs (Haykin 1999).  
The network is generated using IBM Statistics in version 21. Since it was not our main goal to study the 
different possibilities for structural variations of the ANN, an automatic procedure was used for the 
network setup. As a training approach, the batch method was applied in order to assure that the network 
was directly optimised in terms of a global optimum (IBM Corporation 2013). 
The neural network shows very good results regarding the classification of image elements in both 
training and test sets. The ANN was able to classify all images in the training set correctly. With regard to 
the classification of the unknown images in the test set, the overall accuracy was 99.99%.  
Table 6 shows the so-called confusion matrix of the classification. A particularly important result is that 
no false negative classifications were generated that could threaten user privacy.  






Tracking 577 (TP) 0 (FN) 
Non-Tracking 2 (FP) 26,202 (TN) 
The execution time is also a major aspect with regard to the practicability of the prototypical solution. The 
process involves a setup and a usage phase. In the setup (training) phase, the model is built and optimised 
for the data basis. In the usage phase (classification), the model is applied to classify unknown images. 
The training procedure needs to be conducted only rarely and is independent from the classification.  
In our test environment, performance was determined separately for training and classification. The 
measurements were conducted under non-optimised conditions (virtual machine and limited main 
memory), leaving opportunities for performance improvements in subsequent applications. The 
measured times included the feature extraction, but without some fast pre-processing steps. 
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The training time (Figure 9, left) for the ANN shows a relatively linear relationship to the number of 
images that were used for training. The classification time (Figure 9, right) displays a nearly perfect 
linearity. Most importantly, classification was very fast with less than 0.2 ms per image. Full classification 
for a typical mail with 38 external images requires less than 7 ms. This result indicates a high practicality 
for real world application, even when many e-mails have to be processed. 
 
Figure 9: Training Time (left) / Classification Time (right) 
Limitations 
Finally, some important limitations of our research should be considered. The study focuses on tracking 
images, which represent a commonly applied and effective e-mail tracking mechanism. Other techniques 
such as tracking links have so far not been considered in the analysis and countermeasure design, even 
though similar approaches could be adopted.  
The data used in this study only involve professional e-mail newsletters, which carry some important 
advantages for this research setting. Nonetheless, typical mail usage involves additional mail categories, 
especially individual mails. While we expect e-mail tracking to be less common, further studies are 
required on tracking mechanisms in these types of e-mails. Another aspect is the internationality of the 
dataset. Even though three representative countries were used for gathering the newsletters, tracking 
techniques adopted in other countries might slightly deviate and are currently not represented in the data 
set. The location analysis might not be highly accurate, since only free geolocation services were used for 
this study. Nonetheless, the country classification should be correct (Poese et al. 2011).  
The dataset dependency of the tracking-image identification has already been discussed. Furthermore, 
this study uses data gathered in the year 2015. The results therefore reflect the current technological 
development at this time. It is very likely that the use of countermeasures will lead to an enhancement of 
tracking technologies, and will therefore make further advanced detection techniques necessary.  
This study uses an artificial neural network for image classification. Alternative machine learning 
techniques could potentially show better results and should also be considered in further developments. 
Conclusion 
E-mail tracking can be used to gather sensitive information without user control, which raises several 
security and privacy concerns for end-users. Our empirical analysis of over 4,500 e-mails from the top 
100 companies in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States showed that e-mail tracking is widely 
applied in all of these countries. Out of all the e-mails that could potentially contain tracking elements, 
71% actually used tracking images. The tracking quota of German mails was the highest at 88%, followed 
by the mails from the US with 63% and UK with 62%. While the tracking in German mails heavily relied 
on internal tracking, the tracking mails from the US mostly relied on external providers.  
Our evaluation of current countermeasures showed that currently no general, reliable, and sufficient 
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As a first step in the direction of countermeasure realisation, several concepts have been developed and 
discussed in this study. With regard to end-user demands, the identify & block solution seems to be the 
most suitable, since it aims at selectively identifying and blocking tracking images while permitting other 
referenced images. Since e-mail tracking images so far do not provide the receiver with any content and 
are typically invisible, this solution does not reduce functionality or usability for the recipient. 
Based on the analysis of our large empirical dataset with of over 110,000 images, a detection model was 
developed which encompasses six categories of important aspects that are useful for classifying unknown 
images. An artificial neural network was created based on the detection model and used as the decision 
technique for image classification.  
Finally, the usefulness of our approach was evaluated using experiments on a test dataset. The 
experimental results showed that the neural network classified 99.99% of the images correctly and that no 
problematic false negatives occurred. Moreover, the execution speed of our classification algorithm was 
fast, indicating its practical usefulness for future work on a fully implemented countermeasure solution. 
References 
Agosti, M., and Di Nunzio, G. M. 2007. “Gathering and Mining Information from Web Log Files,” in 
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Digital Libraries: Research and Development, C. 
Thanos, F. Borri and L. Candela (eds.), Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 104–113. 
Alsaid, A., and Martin, D. 2003. “Detecting Web Bugs with Bugnosis: Privacy Advocacy through 
Education,” in Privacy Enhancing Technologies, R. Dingledine and P. Syverson (eds.), Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 13–26. 
Benczúr, A. A., Csalogány, K., and Sarlós, T. 2006. “Link-Based Similarity Search to Fight Web Spam 
Information Retrieval on the Web,” in Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on 
Adversarial Information Retrieval on the Web, AIRWeb 2006, Seattle, B. D. Davison, M. Najork and 
T. Converse (eds.), pp. 9–16. 
Beutelspacher, A. 2015. Kryptologie: Eine Einführung in die Wissenschaft vom Verschlüsseln, Verbergen 
und Verheimlichen, Wiesbaden: Springer Spektrum. 
Bonfrer, A., and Drèze, X. 2009. “Real-time Evaluation of E-Mail Campaign Performance,” Marketing 
Science (28:2), pp. 251–263. 
Bouguettaya, A. R. A., and Eltoweissy, M. Y. 2003. “Privacy on the Web: Facts, Challenges, and 
Solutions,” Security & Privacy, IEEE (1:6), pp. 40–49. 
Burkell, J., and Fortier, A. 2013. “Privacy Policy Disclosures of Behavioural Tracking on Consumer Health 
Websites,” in Proceedings of the American Society for Information Science and Technology (50:1), A. 
Grove (ed.), pp. 1–9.  
Campaign Monitor 2010. How Do I Create a Printer-Friendly Email Newsletter? 
https://www.campaignmonitor.com/blog/post/3232/how-do-i-create-a-printer-friendly-email-
newsletter/. Accessed 5 May 2016. 
Cho, J., Garcia-Molina, H., and Page, L. 1998. “Efficient Crawling Through URL Ordering,” in 
Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on World Wide Web 7, P. H. Enslow and A. 
Ellis (eds.), Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, pp. 161–172. 
Cormack, G. V. 2007. “Email Spam Filtering: A Systematic Review,” Foundations and Trends in 
Information Retrieval (1:4), pp. 335–455. 
Dobias, J. 2011. “Privacy Effects of Web Bugs Amplified by Web 2.0,” in Privacy and Identity 
Management for Life, J. Camenisch, S. Fischer-Hübner and K. Rannenberg (eds.), Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 244–257. 
Evans, M. P., and Furnell, S. M. 2003. “A Model for Monitoring and Migrating Web Resources,” Campus-
Wide Information Systems (20:2), pp. 67–74. 
Evers, J. 2006. How HP Bugged E-Mail: Commercial online service was used to track e-mail sent to a 
reporter in Hewlett-Packard's leak probe, investigator testifies. Images: Commercial e-mail tracking. 
http://www.cnet.com/news/how-hp-bugged-e-mail/. Accessed 15 July 2015. 
Fabian, B., Bender, B., and Weimann, L. 2015. “E-Mail Tracking in Online Marketing - Methods, 
Detection, and Usage,” in Proceedings of the 12. International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik 
(WI 2015), O. Thomas and F. Teuteberg (eds.), pp. 1100–1114. 
 E-Mail Tracking: Status Quo and Novel Countermeasures 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 18 
Fausett, L. (ed.) 1994. Fundamentals of Neural Networks: Architectures, Algorithms, and Applications, 
Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Fonseca, F., Pinto, R., and Meira Jr., W. 2005. “Increasing User’s Privacy Control Through Flexible Web 
Bug Detection,” in Proceedings of the Third Latin American Web Congress, R. Bilof (ed.), 
Washington: IEEE Computer Society, pp. 205–213. 
Fourie, I., and Bothma, T. 2007. “Information Seeking: An Overview of Web Tracking and the Criteria for 
Tracking Software,” Aslib Proceedings (59:3), pp. 264–284. 
Harding, W. T., Reed, A. J., and Gray, R. L. 2001. “Cookies and Web Bugs: What They Are and How They 
Work Together,” Information Systems Management (18:3), pp. 17–24. 
Hasouneh, A. B. I., and Alqeed, M. A. 2010. “Measuring the Effectiveness of E-Mail Direct Marketing in 
Building Customer Relationship,” International Journal of Marketing Studies (2:1), pp. 48–64. 
Haykin, S. S. 1999. Neural Networks: A Comprehensive Foundation, Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice 
Hall. 
IBM Corporation 2013. IBM SPSS Neural Networks. 
Javed, A. 2013. “POSTER: A Footprint of Third-party Tracking on Mobile Web,” in Proceedings of the 
2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Communications Security, A.-R. Sadeghi, V. Gligor 
and M. Yung (eds.), New York: ACM, pp. 1441–1444. 
Jensen, C., Sarkar, C., Jensen, C., and Potts, C. 2007. “Tracking Website Data-Collection and Privacy 
Practices with the iWatch Web Crawler,” in Proceedings of the 3rd Symposium on Usable Privacy 
and Security, L. F. Cranor (ed.), New York: ACM, pp. 29–40.  
Krishnamurthy, B., and Wills, C. 2009. “Privacy Diffusion on the Web: A Longitudinal Perspective,” in 
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on World Wide Web, J. Quemada, G. León, Y. 
Maarek and W. Nejdl (eds.), New York: ACM, pp. 541–550. 
Leon, P., Ur, B., Shay, R., Wang, Y., Balebako, R., and Cranor, L. 2012. “Why Johnny Can’t Opt Out: A 
Usability Evaluation of Tools to Limit Online Behavioral Advertising,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, J. A. Konstan, E. H. Chi and K. Höök (eds.), 
New York: ACM, pp. 589–598. 
Lewand, R. E. 2000. Cryptological Mathematics: Mathematical Association of America Textbooks. 
Lin, Z., Lyu, M. R., and King, I. 2006. “PageSim: A Novel Link-based Measure of Web Page Similarity,” in 
Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on World Wide Web , L. Carr, D. De Roure and A. 
Iyengar (eds.), New York: ACM, pp. 1019–1020. 
Litmus labs 2015. Email Client Market Share: Email Client Usage Worldwide, Collected from 1.02 Billion 
Email Opens. http://emailclientmarketshare.com/. Accessed 16 June 2015. 
Martin, D., Wu, H., and Alsaid, A. 2003. “Hidden Surveillance by Web Sites: Web Bugs in Contemporary 
Use,” Communications of the ACM (46:12), pp. 258–264. 
Maurer, M.-E., and Höfer, L. 2012. “Sophisticated Phishers Make More Spelling Mistakes: Using URL 
Similarity Against Phishing,” in Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Cyberspace 
Safety and Security, Y. Xiang, J. Lopez, C.-C. J. Kuo and W. Zhou (eds.), Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer, pp. 414–426. 
Menczer, F. 2004. “Combining Link and Content Analysis to Estimate Semantic Similarity,” in 
Proceedings of the 13th International World Wide Web Conference on Alternate Track Papers & 
Posters, S. Feldman and M. Uretsky (eds.), New York: ACM, pp. 452–453. 
Moscato, D. R., Altschuller, S., and Moscato, E. D. 2013. “Privacy Policies on Global Banks’ Websites: 
Does Culture Matter?” Communications of the IIMA (13:4), pp. 91–109. 
Moscato, D. R., and Moscato, E. D. 2009. “Information Security Awareness in E-commerce Activities of B-
to-C Travel Industry Companies,” International Journal of the Academic Business World, pp. 39–46. 
Musciano, C., and Kennedy, B. 2006. HTML & XHTML: The Definitive Guide (6th Edition): O’Reilly 
Media, Inc. 
Nakatani, K., and Chuang, T. 2011. “A Web Analytics Tool Selection Method: An Analytical Hierarchy 
Process Approach,” Internet Research (21:2), pp. 171–186. 
Peffers, K., Tuunanen, T., Rothenberger, M. A., and Chatterjee, S. 2007. “A Design Science Research 
Methodology for Information Systems Research,” Journal of Management Information Systems 
(24:3), pp. 45–77. 
Poese, I., Uhlig, S., Kaafar, M. A., Donnet, B., and Gueye, B. 2011. “IP Geolocation Databases: Unreliable?” 
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review (41:2), pp. 53–56. 
Premkumar, G., and Roberts, M. 1999. “Adoption of New Information Technologies in Rural Small 
Businesses,” Omega (27:4), pp. 467–484. 
 E-Mail Tracking: Status Quo and Novel Countermeasures 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 19 
Qi, X., Nie, L., and Davison, B. D. 2007. “Measuring Similarity to Detect Qualified Links,” in Proceedings 
of the 3rd International Workshop on Adversarial Information Retrieval on the Web, C. Castillo, K. 
Chellapilla and B. D. Davison (eds.), New York: ACM, pp. 49–56.. 
Schmidt, J. 2013. “E-Mail im Visier: Tracking im Alltag aufspüren und abbestellen,” Magazin für 
Computertechnik (22), pp. 130–135. 
Sipior, J. C., Ward, B. T., and Mendoza, R. A. 2011. “Online Privacy Concerns Associated with Cookies, 
Flash Cookies, and Web Beacons,” Journal of Internet Commerce (10:1), pp. 1–16. 
Waisberg, D., and Kaushik, A. 2009. “Web Analytics 2.0: Empowering Customer Centricity,” The Original 
Search Engine Marketing Journal (2:1), pp. 5–11. 
Wang, Y., Burgener, D., Flores, M., Kuzmanovic, A., and Huang, C. 2011. „Towards Street-Level Client-
Independent IP Geolocation,“ in Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems 
Design and Implementation, USENIX Association. 
Wu, Y.-J., Huang, H., Hao, Z.-F., and Chen, F. 2012. “Local Community Detection Using Link Similarity,” 
Journal of Computer Science and Technology (27:6), pp. 1261–1268. 
